In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Authenticity, Antiquity, and Authority: Dares Phrygius in Early Modern EuropeFrederic ClarkDares Phrygius, “First Pagan Historiographer”In his Etymologies, Isidore of Seville—the seventh-century compiler whose cataloguing of classical erudition helped lay the groundwork for medieval and early modern encyclopedism—offered a seemingly straightforward definition of historiography, with clear antecedents in Cicero, Quintilian, and Servius.1 Before identifying historical writing as a component of the grammatical arts, and distinguishing histories from poetic fables, Isidore (...) confirmed that “history is a narration of deeds [narratio rei gestae], through which things done in the past are discerned.”2 Thereafter, he equated historical writing with eyewitness observation, insisting that “among the [End Page 183] ancients, no one wrote history unless he had been present and seen those things to be recorded.”3 But Isidore’s further treatment of historiography grew more perplexing. Upon affirming that “among us, Moses first composed a history, on the beginning of the world,” he unexpectedly declared that “among the pagans, Dares Phrygius first composed a history, concerning Greeks and Trojans.”4 Only later did the encyclopedist mention more well-known Greek historians (to modern audiences at least) like Herodotus. 5Isidore’s invocation of his “first pagan historiographer” referred most likely to the De excidio Troiae historia (henceforth DET), a fifth- or sixth-century Latin pseudo-history billed as an eyewitness account of the Trojan War. Conveyed in sparse, dry, and inelegant language, the DET was long thought to have been the war diary of one Dares Phrygius, purportedly a Trojan participant in the conflict.6 In reality, the Latin DET was a two-part forgery, as its spurious dedicatory epistle—supposedly from the Augustan-era biographer Cornelius Nepos to the historian Sallust—claimed that “Nepos” had discovered the work in an Athenian archive and rendered it “truly and simply” (vere et simpliciter) from Greek into Latin.7 While potentially derived from a Greek antecedent, perhaps composed as an anti-Homeric jeu d’esprit during the Second Sophistic, the Latin Dares was assuredly not an accurate and verbatim translation of any lost Greek original. 8Notwithstanding its uncertain origins, Isidore’s pagan counterpart to Moses would go on to achieve canonical status in the medieval Latin West, and survives today in approximately 200 manuscripts. Moreover, Dares’s authority was extended through practices of compilation integral to medieval [End Page 184] textual culture.9 This compilatory impulse—which spawned countless multi-text anthologized codices and similarly animated Isidore’s encyclopedism—encouraged the Phrygian’s codicological pairing with numerous sources both ancient and medieval. Not only did the DET serve, codicologically, as a prologue to Trojan origin narratives like Geoffrey of Monmouth’s Historia regum Britanniae, but it was also integrated into the structure of universal history, utilized as a means of augmenting the Chronicon of Eusebius-Jerome.10 Throughout the Middle Ages, Dares served not only as a name to invoke, but also as a source to appropriate and rework: to insert into universal chronicles, append to Trojan genealogies, or render into epic verse. Moreover, the pseudo-author’s status as “first pagan historiographer” was hardly lost on medieval sources: for instance, when William of Malmesbury inserted the DET into his anthology of ancient Roman histories, he made sure to include Isidore’s endorsement directly before the text’s incipit.11 For nearly a millennium, Dares’s fabricated claims of antiquity and autopsy constituted airtight guarantors of textual auctoritas.Between Criticism and Credulity: Dares in Early Modern ScholarshipBut Dares did not remain undisturbed in the canon. Instead, the DET saw its first recorded challenge with the advent of the early Renaissance. Writing in 1400 in his De tyranno, the Florentine Chancellor Coluccio Salutati turned to the Phrygian when debating a favored subject of nascent Italian humanism—the history of early Rome. Here Salutati sought to counter the long-held claim, attested in the DET, that Aeneas was not a pious hero driven from Troy, but rather a duplicitous traitor who had himself betrayed the city to the Greeks.12 The Florentine Chancellor correctly acknowledged that Aeneas’s treason was alleged by “the most ancient historians Dares [End Page 185] Phrygius and Dictys Cretensis” (Dictys, another late antique... (shrink)

Scholarship of the last half century has transformed approaches to paganism and Christianity in the late Roman world. Much as the paradigm of late antiquity has replaced traditional narratives of ‘decline and fall’, expounded systematically in the eighteenth century by Edward Gibbon, so recent scholarship has also challenged older narratives of pagan / Christian conflict, particularly heroic narratives of the resistance mounted by Rome’s ‘last pagans’. This article locates a crucial—although often neglected—prehistory and parallel to these debates in the world (...) of early modern humanist scholarship. It examines how fourth-century Roman pagan authors—especially Quintus Aurelius Symmachus and Ammianus Marcellinus—were read by printers, editors and philologists in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. In a world before Gibbonian decline and fall, humanist scholars navigated both religious conflicts and literary canon wars to articulate a robust vision of late antiquity avant la lettre, although for reasons very different from those which have motivated twentieth- and twenty-first-century revisionists. Even as some of their colleagues dismissed late pagan texts on the grounds of deficient Latinity or deficient Christianity (or both), the early modern scholars who embraced this expansive vision of the ancient canon ended up highlighting the ambiguities of late antique religion—especially the grey area between the ‘pagan’ and the ‘Christian’. (shrink)

This article examines what light new developments in the history of books and reading can shed on the sixteenth-century antiquarian William Lambarde and his assessments of the credibility and historicity of the ancient past. It explores what the retracing of a book’s life cycle—i.e., its travels from composition and revision to reception, via both manuscript and print—can teach us about Lambarde’s magnum opus, his Perambulation of Kent. Specifically, it surveys how both Lambarde and his contemporaries approached one of the most (...) hotly contested questions in early modern scholarship: debates over the ostensible Trojan origins of the British. The article begins by examining links between the history of reading and the history of antiquarianism—two fields which have enjoyed a considerable efflorescence in recent decades. It does so via re-examination of Arnaldo Momigliano’s classic essay ‘Ancient History and the Antiquarian’, published nearly seventy years ago in this Journal. It then examines how not only Lambarde himself, but also various other contemporary or near-contemporary scholars and readers approached the historicity of Britain’s ancient past, whether Trojan or otherwise. The following section explores the ways in which scholars and readers, including Lambarde, construed the fides or credibility of claims concerning such pasts, by dissecting their various strategies for assessing and visualising textual authority and authorial probity, ranging from the production of marginalia to index-making. This section includes an extended case study of the way in which one assiduous reader of Lambarde—Adam Winthrop, father of the future Massachusetts governor John Winthrop—applied these strategies in his copiously annotated copy of the Perambulation. The article closes with broader reflections upon new directions in the history of historical scholarship and the history of reading. (shrink)

From the philosophy of mind and language, through physics and mathematics, to the philosophy of the human sciences, morality and religion, there is almost no area of philosophy to which Hilary Putnam has not made highly original and influential contributions. This wide-ranging collection of papers provides a critical assessment and exploration of Putnam's Seminal Work. Written by Philosophers themselves well known for their work in the field, each essay bears witness to the continuing influence and importance of (...) class='Hi'>Putnam's thought. Putnam's reply constitutes an extensive new essay which clarifies, and develops further, central themes in his philosophy. This volume includes papers by Simon Blackburn, George Boolos, Michael Hallett, Michael Redhead, Thomas Ricketts, David Wiggins and Crispin Wright. (shrink)

Hilary Putnam's Model-Theoretic argument attempts to dispose of the view that science provides us with a literally true description of the world. It uses the Löwenheim-Skolem Theorem to show that all consistent scientific theories are true of the real world, even if they contradict each other. This is incompatible with the realist conception of truth, which allows only for one version of reality. So, Putnam rejected this conception of truth in favour of his own 'internal realism,' which claims (...) that theories can only be true or false within themselves; within their own framework. However, I demonstrate that the Model-Theoretic argument is unsound. It relies on a false premise – that every consistent theory is true of the real world. Putnam uses a clever manipulation of model theory to attempt to convince us of the truth of this premise, but I show that he commits a fundamental error in his method. (shrink)

Our intuitive assumption that only organisms are the real individuals in the natural world is at odds with developments in cell biology, ecology, genetics, evolutionary biology, and other fields. Although organisms have served for centuries as nature’s paradigmatic individuals, science suggests that organisms are only one of the many ways in which the natural world could be organized. When living beings work together—as in ant colonies, beehives, and bacteria-metazoan symbiosis—new collective individuals can emerge. In this book, leading scholars consider the (...) biological and philosophical implications of the emergence of these new collective individuals from associations of living beings. The topics they consider range from metaphysical issues to biological research on natural selection, sociobiology, and symbiosis. -/- The contributors investigate individuality and its relationship to evolution and the specific concept of organism; the tension between group evolution and individual adaptation; and the structure of collective individuals and the extent to which they can be defined by the same concept of individuality. These new perspectives on evolved individuality should trigger important revisions to both philosophical and biological conceptions of the individual. -/- Contributors: Frédéric Bouchard, Ellen Clarke, Jennifer Fewell, Andrew Gardner, Peter Godfrey-Smith, Charles J. Goodnight, Matt Haber, Andrew Hamilton, Philippe Huneman, Samir Okasha, Thomas Pradeu, Scott Turner, Minus van Baalen. (shrink)

Rather than attempting to characterize a relation of confirmation between evidence and theory, epistemology might better consider which methods of forming conjectures from evidence, or of altering beliefs in the light of evidence, are most reliable for getting to the truth. A logical framework for such a study was constructed in the early 1960s by E. Mark Gold and Hilary Putnam. This essay describes some of the results that have been obtained in that framework and their significance for philosophy (...) of science, artificial intelligence, and for normative epistemology when truth is relative. (shrink)

Logical monism is the view that there is ‘One True Logic’. This is the default position, against which pluralists react. If there were not ‘One True Logic’, it is hard to see how there could be one true theory of anything. A theory is closed under a logic! But what is logical monism? In this article, I consider semantic, logical, modal, scientific, and metaphysical proposals. I argue that, on no ‘factualist’ analysis (according to which ‘there is One True Logic’ expresses (...) a factual claim, rather than an attitude like approval), does the doctrine have both metaphysical and methodological import. Metaphysically, logics abound. Methodologically, what to infer from what is not settled by the facts, even the normative ones. I conclude that the only interesting sense in which there could be One True Logic is noncognitive. The same may be true of monism about normative areas, like moral, epistemic, and prudential ones, generally. (shrink)

Jaegwon Kim's Mind in a Physical World is an argument about mental causation that provides both a metaphysical theory and a lucid commentary on contemporary philosophical views. While I strongly recommend Kim's book to anyone interested in the subject, my endorsement is not unconditional, because I cannot make the same recomendation of the subject itself. Considering arguments of Davidson, Putnam, Burge, Block, and Kim himself, I conclude that the subject turns on a variety of implausible but received arguments, and (...) that a useful study of mental causation cannot be divorced from scientific details of cognitive psychology, physics, and neuroscience. (shrink)

This paper is a tentative step toward formalizing in symbolic logic some of the central assumptions of Clark L. Hull's theory of behavior. There will be noticeable deviations from Hull's own terminology and form of statement, but this will be largely in the interest of greater logical simplicity. The notation of symbolic logic will not be used, but the behavioral axioms will be so stated as to admit of easy translation into such notation. Such easy translatability seems to be a (...) prerequisite if theorems are to be derivable with genuine deductive rigor. (shrink)

I defend what I believe to be a new variation on Kripkean themes, for the purpose of providing an improved way to understand the referring functions of proper names. I begin by discussing roles played by perceptual perspectives in the use of proper names, and then broaden the discussion to include what I call cognitive perspectives. Although both types of perspectives underwrite the existence of intentional intermediaries between proper names and their referents, the existence of these intentional intermediaries does not (...) entail that a Kripke-inspired view of direct reference must be abandoned. At the same time, the existence of these intermediaries can be seen to play illuminating roles as regards the referring functions of proper names in the following types of cases, among others: (a) where different names pick out the same subject; (b) where names are empty. Along the way, I argue that perspectival views are not something inside the head of language users as intended by Putnam in his well-known discussion of meaning. (shrink)

This paper is an interpretation and defense of Putnam’s claim that reductionist sentences identifying experiences with physical events or processes are meaningless. Discourses are formulated within frameworks that are characterized by their methods of justification, types of term introduction, and vocabularies. Examples of both meaningful intra-framework and meaningless cross-framework identities are considered, along with examples of theoretical identities across sub-frameworks. In agreement with Putnam, mental/physical identities are classified as cross-framework. But I qualify Putnam’s thesis by arguing that (...) they can be meaningful to theextent they provide guides to beneficial social actions.’. (shrink)

Este volumen, breve pero rico en ideas, en la serie de Cambridge Elements in the Philosophy of Mathematics presenta una visión general del enfoque que su autor ha desarrollado en una serie de trabajos (incluyendo su libro Morality and Mathematics, 2020, del que extrae material que presenta aquí) respecto de una amplia serie de problemas que incluyen, más allá de la filosofía de la matemática, al realismo normativo, modal y lógico. A partir de una discusión acerca de las condiciones que (...) tienen que satisfacerse para que tengamos conocimiento matemático, Clarke-Doane propone que los mismos problemas aparecen en estos otros dominios, y sugiere que adoptemos una misma estrategia (o más bien, el mismo tipo de estrategia) en cada caso. Esta solución consiste en adoptar una forma de pluralismo realista: a pesar de que cada uno de estos dominios es objetivo y de que las verdades que caen bajo cada uno no dependen de lo que nadie piense, cada manera de pensar acerca del dominio es correcta desde cierta perspectiva. La propuesta de Clarke-Doane se alinea con las propuestas de Balaguer (1995), Putnam (1980) y Carnap (1950) y, en efecto, Clarke-Doane sugiere que su forma de pluralismo no es sino la postura de Carnap en clave realista. (shrink)

In the face of argument to the contrary, it is shown that there is defensible middle ground available for entity realism, between the extremes of scientific realism and empiricist antirealism. Cartwright's ([1983]) earlier argument for defensible middle ground between these extremes, which depended crucially on the viability of an underdeveloped distinction between inference to the best explanation (IBE) and inference to the most probable cause (IPC), is examined and its defects are identified. The relationship between IBE and IPC is clarified (...) and a revised version of Cartwright's argument for defensible middle ground, which is free of the identified defects, is presented. (shrink)

What is consciousness? Why and when do we have it? Where does it come from, and how does it relate to the lump of squishy grey matter in our heads, or to our material and social worlds? While neuroscientists, philosophers, psychologists, historians, and cultural theorists offer widely different perspectives on these fundamental questions concerning what it is like to be human, most agree that consciousness represents a 'hard problem'. -/- The emergence of consciousness studies as a multidisciplinary discourse addressing these (...) issues has often been associated with rapid advances in neuroscience-perhaps giving the impression that the arts and humanities have arrived late at the debating table. The longer historical view suggests otherwise, but it is probably true that music has been under-represented in accounts of consciousness. Music and Consciousness aims to redress the balance: its twenty essays offer a timely and multi-faceted contribution to consciousness studies, critically examining some of the existing debates and raising new questions. -/- The collection makes it clear that to understand consciousness we need to do much more than just look at brains: studying music demonstrates that consciousness is as much to do with minds, bodies, culture, and history. Incorporating several chapters that move outside Western philosophical traditions, Music and Consciousness corrects any perception that the study of consciousness is a purely occidental preoccupation. And in addition to what it says about consciousness the volume also presents a distinctive and thought-provoking configuration of new writings about music. (shrink)

In this note, I point out a mathematically well-defined way of non-trivially comparing the sizes of uncountable sets of equal cardinality.

Australia and New Zealand boast an active community of scholars working in the field of history, philosophy and social studies of science. Australasian Studies in History and Philosophy of Science aims to provide a distinctive publication outlet for their work. Each volume comprises a group of thematically-connected essays edited by scholars based in Australia or New Zealand with special expertise in that particular area. In each volume, a majority ofthe contributors are from Australia or New Zealand. Contributions from elsewhere are (...) by no means ruled out, however, and are actively encouraged wherever appropriate to the balance of the volume in question. Earlier volumes in the series have been welcomed for significantly advancing the discussion of the topics they have dealt with. I believe that the present volume will be greeted equally enthusiastically by readers in many parts of the world. R. W. Home General Editor Australasian Studies in History And Philosophy of Science viii ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS The majority of the papers in this collection had their origin in the 2001 Australasian Association for History, Philosophy, and Social Studies of Science annual conference, held at the University of Melbourne, where streams of papers on the themes of scientific realism and commonsense were organised. (shrink)

Scanlon’s Being Realistic about Reasons (BRR) is a beautiful book – sleek, sophisticated, and programmatic. One of its key aims is to demystify knowledge of normative and mathematical truths. In this article, I develop an epistemological problem that Scanlon fails to explicitly address. I argue that his “metaphysical pluralism” can be understood as a response to that problem. However, it resolves the problem only if it undercuts the objectivity of normative and mathematical inquiry.

Descartes is possibly the most famous of all writers on the mind, but his theory of mind has been almost universally misunderstood, because his philosophy has not been seen in the context of his scientific work. Desmond Clarke offers a radical and convincing rereading, undoing the received perception of Descartes as the chief defender of mind/body dualism. For Clarke, the key is to interpret his philosophical efforts as an attempt to reconcile his scientific pursuits with the theologically orthodox (...) views of his time. (shrink)

Der Aufsatz untersucht die fiktive Technologie, die Avatar in Bezug zu weiteren im Text genannten Netzwerken antreibt. Als eine narrative Realisierung von embodied mediation (verkörperter Vermittlung bzw. Mediatisierung) ist der Avatar in avatar die organische Metamorphose eines medialen Systems, ein hybrider biokybernetischer Apparat, der bedeutsame existentielle Widersprüche generiert. avatar ist weiterhin eine Allegorie derjenigen Medientechnik, die für seine eigene Produktion angewendet wurde. Das Begehren, die disembodied mediations (entkörperte Vermittlung bzw. Mediatisierung) zu mediatisieren, Zeichen in Gegenstände zurück zu verwandeln, beruht auf (...) dem, was tatsächlich und immer möglich war: der Verwandlung von Gegenständen in Zeichen. This paper examines the fictive technology that drives avatar in relation to other networks named by the text. A narrative realization of, the avatar in avatar is the organic metamorphosis of a media system, a hybridic biocybernetic apparatus generating significant existential contradictions. avatar is also an allegory of the media technology that went into its own production. The desire to remediate disembodied mediations, to turn signs back into objects, rests on what is actually and always possible, the transformation of objects into signs. (shrink)

The similarities between the United States and South Africa with respect to race, power, oppression and economic inequities are striking, and a better understanding of these parallels can provide educational gains for students and educators in both countries. Through shared experiences and perspectives, this volume presents scholarly work from U.S. and South African scholars that advance educational practice in support of social justice and transformative learning. It provides a comprehensive framework for developing transformational learning experiences that facilitates leadership for social (...) justice, and a deeper understanding of the factors influencing personal, national and global identity. (shrink)

Série de l’ère #MeToo, I May Destroy You de Michaela Coel montre que la violence est une potentialité inhérente à la relation sexuelle. Le viol n’est pas le problème spécifique de la série, mais plutôt le cas extrême et paradigmatique qui donne lieu à une problématisation plus générale de la sexualité ordinaire, en une famille de cas hétérogènes. Le point culminant de la série est la manière dont elle transmue le genre du « Rape and Revenge », en substituant à (...) la vengeance des formes politiques d’action, par la puissance du récit et de la parole publique. (shrink)

Most large frauds develop only gradually and incidentally. When things fall apart it is politic to call it anything but fraud. The author is a member of the Department of Sociology, University of Liverpool, POB 147, Liverpool L69 3BX.